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The Employment Impact of Illegal Aliens
Vernon M. Briggs, Jr.
Cornell University
Over its national history there are few influences that have been more
important to the development of the population and the labor force of the
United States than immigration. The descriptive phrase "a nation of immi-
grants" is no mere cliche. It correctly portrays both the quantitative
magnitude of the mass number of people who have come and who are still
coming to the United States as well as the vital qualitative characteristics
of their skill contributions toward the building of the nation.' The fact
that the United States continues to receive substantial inflows of immi-
grants remains a distinguishing feature of the nation from the practices of
all other countries of the world. Throughout the 1970s and extending into
the early 1980s, the United States legally admitted twice as many
immigrants and refugees in absolute numbers as did all of the remaining
nations of the world combined. So substantial have been the flows of immi-
grants during the 1970s and early 1980s, that imm)gration has already
become equal to fertility as an explanation for the annual growth in-
creases in both the population and labor force of the country.l
Yet as the nation has grappled over the years to establish a viable
immigration policy, large numbers of persons have consistently circum-
vented whatever regulatory system existed by simply entering illegally.
Illegal immigration, therefore, is not a new issue. Rather, it has been
a persistent problem that began in the 1880s when the first restrictions
on immigration were imposed. Having conceded the long term nature of the
illegal imnligration issue, however, it is important to note that the
adverse economic consequences as well as the scale of illegal immigration
2have increased considerably over time. Hence, the mere fact of its long
history is by no means a sufficient argument for a benign attitude toward
its contemporary importance or resignation that it is futile to try to
control.
Like all important national issues, illegal immigration is complex
in the determination of its causes; complicated in terms of the ability to
assess its impact, and controversial with regard to the implications of the
needed policy reforms. By far, the most important issues surrounding the
whole question of illegal immigration are those that relate to the economic
effects. There are important non-economic issues to be sure, but the effects
of illegal immigration on employment and income opportunities for citizen
workers have emerged as the central issue of the on-going debate over the
impact of illegal immigrants on American society. Moreover, labor market reforms
have been the core of all of the policy proposals for addressing this issue.
The Classification of Illegal Immigrants
There are two different types of illegal immigrants. One consists of
those who enter the United States in a surreptitious manner. They may swim,
sail, row, drive, climb, or walk over some portion of the nation's land or
sea borders. Sometimes they come as individuals; sometimes as groups. Many
are guided or transported by human smugglers for a fee. The conditions of
2
entry are often hazzardous and dangerous. The unifying characteristic of
this group is that they have entered the United States without appropriate
documents. In the parlance of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS)--the government agency responsible for the enforcement of the nation's
immigration laws, they are classified as persons who have "entered without
ins pe ct ion" (0 r EWIs) . They are "undocumented." Typi ca lly, EWls are from
the neighboring nations of Mexico or Canada. The term may also apply to
some persons of other nationalities who use Canada or Mexico as waystations
3for eventual illegal entry into the United States. It is the act of entering
without inspection that renders their status in the United States as being illegal.
The second group consists of those persons who legally enter the United
States by passing through an established port-of-entry. At that time, they
may present authentic documents but they subsequently violate the terms of
their visa by overstaying past its expiration date or they seek work during
their visa period when, except in prescribed circumstances, non-immigrants
are prohibited from doing so. In other instances, they may be persons who
present false documents when they enter or who illegally use someone else's
documents as a means of entry. There are also some persons who unlawfully
pose as American citizens when crossing a border. All of these types of
persons are called "visa abusers". There is no typical visa abuser. They
come from virtually every country in the world. They can be tourists, students,
businessmen, crewmen, or a host of other categories of persons who have already
entered the country. The fact that they overstay their visas or that they
seek employment during their legal stay places them in violation of the immi-
gration statutes.
Thus, the entry process of EWIs and of visa abusers are distinctly dif-
ferent even though both are collectively referred to as illegal immigrants.
The Statistics of Illegal Immigration
By the very circumstances of their presence, illegal immigrants seek
to avoid contact with the established agencies of government. If they reveal
themselves as either EWIs or visa abusers, they endanger their presence in
the country. Hence, there is no effort made--nor can it be. expected that
there ever should be--to actually collect data through self-identification.
The only available government data source, therefore, pertains to the number
of apprehensions of deportable aliens or persons required to depart each
year by the INS in the performance of its enforcement duties.
4The number of reported illegal immigrants apprehended by the INS
for the years 1925 to 1980 are shown in Table 1. The largest absolute
number of apprehended illegal immigrants in anyone year to date occurred
in the early 1950s. These figures reflect the fact that the Eisenhower
Administration launched an aggressive sweep--called "Operation Wetback"-~of
the southwestern border region during 1953 and 1954. Given the greatly
enhanced sensitivities for the feelings of racial and ethnic subgroups of
the population and the subsequent development of a number of strong Hispanic
community organizations that have occurred since that time, it is unlikely
that any such indiscriminate and massive roundups will ever again occurr--
nor should they.
If one considers the apprehensions during the 1953-4 period to be a
tactical abberation, it was not until the mid-1960s that apprehensions
surged upward again. The explanation for the increase at that time can
largely be attributed to the unilateral termination of the Mexican Labor
Program (often called the bracero program) by the United States on December
31, 1964. The "bracero program" was a labor importation program whereby
non-immigrant workers from Mexico were legally allowed to be employed ih
agricultural jobs in the Southwest.3 It was initiated during World War II
as an emergency manpower program but continued for twenty-two years. Starting
in the mid-1960s apprehensions increased steadily until 1980 when there was
a slight drop. The long term trend of mounting apprehensions has occurred since
1964 despite the fact that there has been very little appreciable increase
in the real budget of the INS (adjusting for inflationary increases) nor
the number of its personnel.
There are severe problems associated with using the apprehension
data as an indicator of the magnitude of illegal immigration. To begin
with, the data cannot avoid multiple counting. Some persons--especially'
Tab 1e V-l. 111 ega 1 Immi grants Apprehended,
192t>-1980
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Period
1925-1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
. 1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1978
1980
Number of Apprehended
Illegal Immigrants
128,484
22,276
22,735
20,949
10,319
11 ,016
11 ,728
13,054
12,851
12,037
10,492
11 ,294
11 ,784
11,175
31,174
69,164
99,591
193,657
192,779
288,253
468,339
509,040
528,815
885,587
1,089,583
254,096
87,696
59,918
53,474
45,336
70,684
88,823
92,758
88 , 712
86,597
110,371
138,520
161,608
212,057
283,557
345,353
420,126
505,949
655,968
788,145
756,819
866,433
1,033,427
1,047,687
1,069,400
910,361
Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Annual Reports of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service.
6in the Southwest--are caught more than once in any given year. But,
presumably, the problem of repeat captures has always been in the data.
There is no reason to believe that this multiple counting problem is pro-
portionate1y more severe now than it was in the past. Hence, rising ap-
prehensions, as reflected in the data in Table 1, can be used in a general
way to infer increases in the absolute numbers of illegal immigrants despite
the duplication problem.
The apprehension levels for anyone year are, to some degree, a reflec-
tion of the staffing patterns of the border enforcement agency--i.e., the
INS.4 The slight drop in apprehensions in 1980, for instance, is seen to
be a reflection of both budget cutbacks that year and a self-imposed
moratorium on raids that was put into effect by the INS during the several
months that the 1980 Census count was in progress. The moratorium was
deemed necessary to assuage fears that Census participation might lead to
persons being turned into the INS. Indications from preliminary data for
1981 and 1982 are that apprehensions have returned to the trend toward
annually higher numbers.
Another serious bias problem in the apprehension data derives from the
fact that the INS concentrates most of its border patrol activities on the
Southwest border. Hence, over ninety percent of those persons apprehended
each year are from Mexico. The INS has long ago recognized that it is
much easier and cheaper to apprehend EWIs along the southwestern border
region than it is to ferret-out visa abusers who can be living and working
almost anywhere in the United States. As Mexicans are most likely to be
EWIs, it is they who usually get caught. Illegal immigrants from nations
other than Mexico are most likely to be visa abusers and are least likely
7to be apprehended. The apprehension data, therefore, have contributed to
the false public impression that illegal immigration is largely a Mexican
problem. It is not. It is generally believed that Mexico accounts for
60 percent of the annual flow while 20 percent come from Caribbean countries
and the remaining 20 percent come from other nations in both the eastern
and western hemisphere.5 There is, of course, no way to confirm the actual
distribution since the population itself is unknown. The Department of
Justice reports that "at least 60 countries are significant regular 'source'
countries. II Aside from Mexico, which is the acknowledged prime source,
there are fourteen other nations that are considered to be the most prominent
sources. Ranked in what is roughly believed to be the order of their sig-
nificance beginning with the largest, they are: the Dominican Republic,
Haiti, Jamaica, Guatemala, Columbia, Peru, Ecuador, the Phillipines, Korea,
Thailand, Greece, India, Iran, and Nigeria.6
The most severe problem with the INS apprehension data, however, is
the obvious one: namely, it only counts those who are caught. It is
conceded by both INS and all other studies of illegal immigrants that ap-
prehensions are only the tip of the iceberg. Most illegal immigrants--
especially most visa abusers--are never caught. For instance, the only
serious study of illegal immigrants who were not in an apprehension status
at the time they were interviewed was done for the u.S. Department of Labor
and released in 1979. It found that of the 1,970 illegal immgirants in
Los Angeles who were employed at the time that they were interviewed, 69.6
percent had never been previously apprehended.7 Most of the persons in
their sample were Mexicans (92.6 percent) and EWIs. This study lends
credence to the belief that the actual number of illegal immigrants entering
the United States each year is certainly several multiples of the number
8actually reported as being apprehended even when allowances for double
counting are made.
A myrid of studies have been conducted by the INS, by academicians, by
the Mexican government as well as by other interested commissions and government
agencies in a futile quest to find a reliable estimate of the stock of illegal
immigrants in the United States. Yet the situation remains unchanged from
the state of affairs in 1979 when the National Commission on Employment and
UnemploymentStatistics completed its work on the adequacy of the nation's
labor force indicators. With regard to illegal immigrants, the Commission
concluded:
No single area in labor statistics is as undeveloped,
incomplete, and imprecise as is our data on undocumented
workers. Estimates of the illegal alien population, the
labor market situation of undocumented workers, and the
effects of their presence on the supply and the demand
for resident workers vary widely.8
The Commission strongly recommended that "the scope and frequency" of studies
that would estimate the size and impacts of illegal immigrants "should be
increased. II
Likewise, given its mandate when it was established by Congress in 1978,
the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Pol icy aho felt obliged to
secure some estimate of the stock of illegal immigrants. The Commiss ion, h.ow-
ever, elected not to make an independent estimate of its. own. Ins tead, it re-
quested a report by the Bureau of the Census. The subsequent Census review
placed ,the stock of illegal immigrants within a range of between 3.5 to 6 million
persons.9 The Census figures, however, were derived exclusively from a staff
review of the existing literature as manifested by reports by the INS and
some research by a few academicians. These earlier studies employed various
methodologies to estimate the size of the illegal immigration population.
9All were based on data for various years in the early to mid-1970s--not
for 1981 when the Select Commission's final report was released. The important
point is that the Bureau of the Census did not make any new estimates for
the Select Commission. Hence, the quoted range supplied to the Select Com-
mission and published in its final report is merely the result of the averaging
of the modes of non-comparable "guestimates" from all of the previously men-
tioned studies--many of which were of dubious statistical validity--to get
its range. Unfortunately, none of these limitations are known to most people
who read the Report of the Commission--nor will the following qualification
by the Census Bureau to its own revi ew:
Wehave, unfortunately, been unable to arrive at
definitive estimates of the number of illegal residents
in the United States or the magnitude of the illegal
migration flow. The phenomenonwe have sought to measure,
by its nature, is not an easy one to deal with. Researchers
and policymakers will have -to live with the fact that the
number of illegal residents in the United States cannot
be closely quantified. Therefore, policy options dependent
on the size of this group must be evaluated in terms which
recognize this uncertainty.10
As this warning is not mentioned in the Commission1s Report, the quoted
range has subsequently been mistakenly cited as being a maximumrange for 1981
when it is, if anything a minimum estimate of the illegal immigrant pop-
ulation as of some time period in the early 1970s.
Frankly stated, there will never be any better data available on this
question. The illegal character of the entire process forestalls the pos-
sibility that the actual number of persons involved will ever be known.
Estimates and anecdotes are all that is ever going to be available. But
before one despairs that little can be learned because the data is so poor,
it should be realized that this also is the case with most of the major social
problems of the day. Reliable data are unavailable about the size of energy
supplies, local labor market conditions, crime, health, and mental health,
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to name only a few issues of national concern. Yet in all of these other
vital areas of public concern, the lack of data has not precluded major policy
initiatives from being initiated to meet perceived needs. Furthermore, it
makes little conceptual difference whether the stock of illegal immigrants
in the nation is 3 million, or 6 million, or 9 million or 12 million persons.
All of these numbers have been cited in various official reports and research
studies in the 1970s. The precise number, however, is irrelevant if one
concedes that the number of persons involved is substantial and that the
direction of change is toward annually increasing numbers.
Public Policy and the Growth of Illegal Immigration
The multiple factors that have caused illegal immigration to become
an issue of national consequence are beyond the scope of this present article.
They involve the co-existance of "push" factors (they include such concerns
as population pressures, unemployment, underemployment, poverty, lack of
hope for political reform, and human rights violations) that permeate life in
their respective homelands as w,ell as "pull II factors (such as the prospect of a
higher standard of living, higher wages, a broader array of occupations, and a
democratic governmental structure) that ~manate from the Uni.ted States. But,
for present purposes, it is vital to note that there is anoth.er vital contribu-
ting factor that is well within the means of the policymakers of the nation to
correct. It is the gross permissiveness of the immigration system. For
despite the fact that the nation has gradually constructed a unitary world-
wide immigration system that is comprehensive in its coverage, it has failed
to make that extant system enforceable. Illegal immigration has been allowed
to make a mockery of any pretense that the system can actually regulate the
flow of immigrants into the population and the labor force.
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No matter how careful an examination is made of the causitive factors
that prompt people to leave their homelands or that attract people to the
United States, the absence of any serious efforts to enforce the existing
immigration statutes is a signal itself to many persons that the United
States really welcomes them despite the legal pretense that it does not.
In fact, there are Mexican scholars who have examined this issue and who
are convinced that the lack of credible deterrence efforts is no accident.
They argue that the United States actually wants to have illegal immigrants
as a means of keeping the labor market for unskilled workers in constant
11
surplus. During the period in 1982 when the Simpson-Mazzoli bill was
pending before Congress, for instance, it was reported that many Mexicans
"commonlyassume that the U.S. economy's demand for foreign labor is
ineradicable, even in a recession; and many maintain a Marxist world-view
leading them to believe business interests dominate Congress and, thus,
would never allow Congress to pass or to enforce stiff employer sanctions.,,12
To be specific, there is an anomaly in the state of the law in the
United States involving the employment of illegal immigrants. While it
is against the law for non-resident immigrants to seek employment, it is
not against the law for an employer to hire an illegal alien. The Immi-
gration and Nationality Act of 1952 made the importation and harboring
of illegal aliens a felony. As a concession to Texas agricultural inter-
ests, however, the Act contains a section stating that employment and the
related services provided -by employers to employees (i .e., transportation,
housing, or feeding) do not constitute an illegal act of harboring. The
effect of this "proviso" is to make employers immune from prosecution if
they hire such workers. Thus, one of the most important barriers to ef-
fective control of illegal immigrants is the fact that the act of employment
12
of an illegal immigrant is not itself illegal. Since employers incur no
risk, there is no apparent reason why they should refrain from doing so.
As for the illegal immigrants themselves, it is only an unimportant
technicality that the law makes it a punishable offense for them to seek
employment in the United States. Over 95 percent of those who are appre-
hended (who are, it should be recalled, overwhelmingly Mexicans) by the
INS are simply given a "voluntary departure II and returned to their home-
land by the most expedient form of transportation. Only the scant remainder
(who are often multiple offenders or persons who have committed a criminal
offense in the United States) are subjected by the INS to formal deportation
proceedings that would render any subsequent entry a felony.13 More fre-
quent prosecution could serve as a deterrent. The U.S. government to date,
however, has not believed that the issue warrants a sufficient increase
in the number of hearing officers to raise the level of prosecutions sig-
nificantly. As a result, those aliens allowed to leave through the volu-
tary departure system are in so way deterred from returning at will.
Thus, a realistic appraisal of the current situation is that if an
illegal alien is caught, he is simply returned to his native land; if he
is not apprehended, he works at a job that affords him an income higher
than his alternatives in his homeland. For the businessman there is no risk
of loss; there are only gains from tapping a cheap source of labor that is
completely bound to arbitrary terms of employment.
Thus, despite the fact that the immigration statutes seek to regulate
the total flow of immigrants in order to assure that the domestic labor
force is not adversely affected in terms of their employment and income
opportunities, there are no corollary laws to make this stance meaningful.
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With specific reference to this paradox, the California Court of Appeals
ruled in 1970 that the number of illegal al iens in the Southwest "represent
an abject failure of national policy" and it observed that the lack of
meaningful corrective action "must be ascribed to self-imposed impotence
of our national government...14
The policy charade is carried one step further by recognition that
the Immigration and Naturalization Service has been chronically under-
funded and understaffed since its inception. As of 1981, for instance,
the U.S. Border Patrol had an on-duty officer corps of only 2,093 officers.15
Given the fact that there are eight hour shifts and five day work weeks, it
is unlikely that there are more than 400 officers on duty at any given time.
Most of these officers are assigned to the 1,945 mile border with Mexico
but some ar~ also assigned to the Canadian border and to other duties. In
addition, for inland duty away from the border, the INS had only 1,489 immi-
gration inspectors to cover the entire nation.16 Thus, the total enforcement
apparatus of the INS is actually smaller than the police force of the District
of Columbia. Given the small number of enforcement offi cers reJat:ive to the
magnitude of the responsibilities that they are assigned, it is amazing that
they apprehend as many illegal immigrants as they do. On the other hand, the
scant resources assigned to this task only contributes to the cynical at-
titude of those who do not really believe that the nation is serious when
it says that it wishes to exclude illegal immigrants.
Thus, if it were not for the human tragedy that is associated with
the illegal immigration phenomenon, the entire deterrence policy reads
like a Mack Sennett comedy script. Employers who hire illegal immigrants
commit no crime; most of those caught are given no penalty; and hardly any
14
manpower and resources are devoted to the management of entry. There is
really little need to ponder or debate the complex causes of illegal immi-
gration given the paltry state of enforcement activities and the reluc-
tance of the Congress to date to give the subject any attention. Stronger
deterrence measures by themselves will not stop illegal immigration but
without them, absolutely nothing else makes any sense or has any chance of
reducing the growing magnitude of this flow.
The Labor Market Consequences
Although available research is limited, all studies of illegal immi-
grants in the United States conclude that the primary explanation for their
presence is the search fer jobs. They also show that, by and large, they
are successful. Other motviations, such as criminal activity or income
maintenance support from available income transfer programs appear to be
relatively. inconsequential. Thus, the question of labor market impact of
illegal immigrants has repeatedly surfaced as one of the most critical and
controversial issues surrounding the whole subject.
As noted earlier, there are no established data series for illegal
immigrants. As the population of illegal immigrants is unknown, it is
impossible to draw a random sample that would be scientifically reliable.
Hence, research efforts to verify the occupational, industrial, and
geographic employment patterns of illegal immigrants have been few in number.
Even those that are available have had to conduct their studies under ex-
tremely restricted circumstances. There are only two studies that have
made a serious attempt to capture some measure of these patterns. One was
a nationwide study made of apprehended illegal immigrants by David North
and Marion Houstoun in 1976.17 The second was a study made of unapprehended
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illegal immigrants in Los Angeles in 1979 by a research team from the
University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA).18 Both studies were funded
by the U.S. Department of Labor. Both studies have their limitations but
the conceptual weaknesses tend to be offsetting. The North and
Houstoun study was composed entirely of apprehended illegal immigrants.
Because a disproportionate number of apprehended Mexican illegal immigrants
are employed in agriculture, the North and Houstoun study has a bias in
the number of farm workers in their study. Conversely, the UCLAstudy
was done entirely within the urban center of Los Angeles. As a result, it
disproportionately underestimates the employment of illegal immigrants in
agriculture. In the North and Houstoun study, the respondents had been
in the United States for an average of 2.5 years while in the UCLAstudy
the mean was 4.0 years. In the North and Houstoun study, there were 793
respondents of whom 48.6 percent were from Mexico; in the UCLA study,
there were 2,792 respondents of whom 92.5 percent were Mexican.
The occupational patterns of the respondents in the two studies are
shown in Table 2. Clearly, the illegal immigrants are concentrated in the
unskilled occupations of farm workers, service workers, non-farm laborers
as well as the semi-skilled occupations of operatives. A significant
number are also in the skilled blue collar occupation of craft workers.
Very few were found in any white collar occupation.
In comparison, Table 3 shows distribution of the occupational patterns
in the United States for all workers; for all Hispanic workers (i.e.,
Mexican origin, Cubans, Puerto Ricans, and others of Spanish origin); for
all Mexican origin; and all black workers for 1977 (the year closest to
the dates in whi.ch the two studies of illegal immigrants were conductedL
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Table 2. Employment Patterns of Illegal Immigrants from Two Research
Studies Prepared for the U.S. Department of Labor.
Los Angeles Community Study
1972-197S8
Detention Site
Study, 1974- SA Previously Never
All Apprehended Apprehended Apprehended
Aliens Total Aliens Aliens
White Colla r: 5.4 10.5 6.6 12.1
Professional
and Technical 1.6 4.3 2.7 5.0
Managers and
Administrators 1.3 0.7 .8 .7
Salesworkers 1.1 1.9 .8 2.3
Clerical 1.4 3.6 2.3 . 4.1
Blue Collar: 55.2 73.0 79.0 70.4
Craft Workers 15.3 28.8 32.8 27.1
Operatives 25.1 31.8 31.1 32.1
Non-Fann
laborers 14.8 12.4 15.1 11.2
Service Workers 20.6 16.1 14.2 16.9
Farm Workers 18.8 .4 .2 .5
Tota 1 Percent 100.0 100.0 . 100.0 100.0
Sources: ADavid S. North and Marion F. Houstoun, The Characteristics and Role
of Illegal Aliens in the U.S. labor Market: An Exploratory Study,
Washington, D.C., linton & Company, 1976, p. 104.
BMaurice D. Van Arsdol Jr., Joan Moore, David Heer, Susan P. Haynie,
Non-Apprehended and Apprehended Undocumented Residents in the Los
Angeles Labor Market. Final Draft submitted to the U.S. Department
of labor under Research Contract No. 20-06-77-16, (May, 1979), p. 65.
17
Table 3. Percent Distribution of all Employed Persons in U.S.; All Em-
ployed Hispanic Persons, all Employed Mexican Origin Persons,
and All Employed Black Persons, 1977.
All U.S.
Workers
All
Hispanics
Mexican
Origin
Black
Workers
Total Employed 90,546,000
100.0
3,938,000
100.0
2,335,000
100.0
9,812,000
Percent 100.0
Occupations:
White Collar: 49.9 31. 7 27.2 35.3
Professional
and Technical 15.1 7.4 5.6 11.8
Managers and
Admin.
Sa 1esworkEirs
10.7
6.3
5.6
3.7
4.9
3.0
4.8
2.6
Clerical 17.8 15.0 13.7 16.1
Blue Collar:
Craft Workers
33.3 46.6 49.3 37.6
Operat i ves
Transport
Operatives
13.1
11.4
13.7
20.9
15.0
20.4
9.0
15.1
3.8 4.1 4.6 5.2
Non-Farm
Laborers 5.0 7.9 9.3 8.3
.
Farm Workers
13.7
3.0
17.1
4.4
16.5
6.9
25.0
2.2
Service Workers
Source: Morris Newman "A Profile of Hispanics in the U.S. Work Force,"
Monthly Labor Review (December 1978), pp. 3-13; and Employment
and Training Report of the President, 1979 (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1979), pp. 262-3.
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The data contained in Table 2 closely resembles the patterns of these
racial and ethnic sub-groups in Table 3. With respect to Chicanos
(i .e., those persons of Mexican origin who are citizen workers),
they are employed disproportionately in exactly the same
occupati ons as are most i llega 1 iromigrants in the cited studies..
The employment pattern of Chicanos, in fact, better resembles
the pattern of illegal immigrants than it does the distribution pattern
of all U.S. workers. The fact that both Chicano workers and illegal im-
migrants are geographically concentrated in the same selected urban and
rural labor markets of the five states of the Southwest makes it certain
that the two groups are highly competitive in the same labor markets. In
fact, a public opinion pool conducted by the University of Texas in 1982
designed to identify the mosf important problems in Texas found that more
Mexican Americans cited the problem of illegal immigrants as the state's
most pressing problem than did any other racial grouping.19 The data on
blacks in Table 2 is only given as a reference to add to the fact that there
are millions of citizen workers who are employed in the same occupations as
are illegal immigrants. Black workers, of course, are not geographically con-
centrated in the same general labor markets as are Chicanos or Mexical illegal
immigrants. In a number of specific labor markets (e.g., in Los Angeles,
Chicago, San Antonio, Miami, and Houston), however, they do compete. Like-
wise, it is increasingly the case that black workers in urban labor markets
in the East (e.g.,New York City and Washington, D.C.) are feeling the adverse effects
of job competition from illegal immigrants from nations other than Mexico.20
The data supplied by these two empirical studies plus numerous anecdotal
accounts from other sources strongly suggest that the impact of illegal immi-
grants is selective. Thus, it is not at the aggregate or macro level of the
economy but, rather, in selective or micro labor markets, that their presence
19
is manifested. At least three separate circumstances would seem worthy
the sub-standard labor market (i.e., wages and workingof discussion:
conditions that exist despite laws that ban such practices); the secondary
labor market (i.e., wages are low but are at least in compliance with
federal minimums while working conditions and benefits are minimal or
nonexistant); the primary labor market (i.e., high paying jobs and sub-
stantial fringe benefits and desirable working conditions).
The Substandard Case
Some portion of the illegal immigrant work force are no doubt taken
advantage-of or sought-out primarily because they can be exploited. This
situation, however, appears to be the exception rather than the rule. The
North-Houstoun study, for instance, found that 76 percent of its respondents
had earned the federal minimumwage or better in the job they held at the
time of their apprehension.21 Even this percentage is probably low due to
the disproportionate number of Mexicans who were employed in agriculture
in the North-Houstoun study. The UCLAstudy of urban illegal immigrants
did not collect wage data. It did compute, however, "income" data, which
shows that the income of their respondents averaged about $1,000 a year
more than that of the North-Houstoun interviewees.22
For those who work under exploitive conditions, it is unlikely that
illegal immigrants take any significant number of jobs that would otherwise
be held by citizens. Yet this is certainly no excuse for the perpetuation
of their presence. If it is wrong for citizens to work under unfair work
standards, it is equally wrong for illegal aliens to do so. Job protection
laws exist to safeguard all who work in the United States irrespective of
their immigration status or their personal desires to be protected.
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The Secondary Labor Market
The preponderance of illegal immigrant workers are employed in the
secondary labor market of the economy. It seems that, in the process of
their development, the structure of labor markets in industrial societies
change. Co-existant with the creation of high paying, stable, and rewarding
jobs, there are also jobs created that lack all of these features. In compar-
ison, these jobs appear far less attractive to would-be workers. These
less desirable jobs comprise what has become known as a secondary labor
. market.23 The quandry for the industrialized nations of the world is,
therefore, how is it possible to fill these jobs that, while they may seem
to be undesirable, are, nonetheless essential to the operation of these
economies. Michael Piore has argued that in the past these societies have
looked toward the margins of the labor force to find these types of workers.
There they have found youths, housewives, and farmer-workers as well as to
the minority groups that have been denied opportunities in the past to have
access to the better jobs. But, given the developments in the United States
in the 1970s and early 1980s, these traditional sources of workers are
often no longer available. Youths have proven to be undependable for many
jobs as they often do not identify themselves with permanent workers. They
are often "target earners" who are seeking income from a job only to buy a
particular object--a car, a stereo, or for pocket money--rather than as a
means of support (which is often provided by parents). Housewives, with
the rise of the feminist movement and a trend toward smaller families, are
increasingly inclined toward career development rather than marginal work
attachments. Likewise, the dramatic decline in agricultural employment due
to extensive mechanization in recent decades means that there are fewer
farmers who can be attracted to work second jobs or off-season in the
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non-agricultural sector. And, of course, the progression of the civil
rights movement since the 1960s has been increasingly directed toward
improvement in the preparation for better jobs and toward opening up access
to a wider range of jobs for minority workers. It is alleged, therefore,
that these traditional segments of the labor force who have been available
to the secondary labor market are either unavailable or unwilling to fill
these types of jobs in contemporary times. Hence, in Western Europe and
the United States employers have turned increasingly toward temporary
workers to fill-in the gaps in the secondary labor market.24 In Europe,
foreign worker programs that were supposed to be of temporary duration were
created in the post-World War II era and lasted through to the early 1970s.
In the United States, there have also been some temporary worker programs
but it has been illegal immigrants who have come to be relied upon as sources
of unskilled labor supply in some industries and occupations. Also, in
Europe illegal immigration since the termination of the foreign worker
programs has also become an increasingly important source of workers for
certain types of jobs.25 Piore's view, therefore, is that it is fruitless
to try to restrict illegal immigration as long as the secondary labor market
exists. Other scholars have echoed this belief and drawn the similar con-
elusion that illegal immigrants take only jobs that citizens shun so that
there is a minimal displacement effect.26 Consequently, if the nation really
wants to reduce the flow of illegal immigrants, Piore argues that it will
be necessary to abolish the secondary labor market as a source of labor
demand. He suggests this could be done by raising substantially the federal
minimum wage, by sharply increasing the enforcement of job protection laws,
and by legislatively encouraging the opportunities for unionization of
many low wage industries. He is not optimistic that the policymakers of
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the nation are willing to take any of these steps. Hence, he feels illegal
immigration will continue for as long as it is useful to employers.
"
"""&\'''i~~~~..-
There are some key deficiencies in the Piore thesis. To begi n with,
Piore does not give credance to the importance of "push" factors in the
illegal immigrant process. The analysis is conducted solely in terms of
an alledged demand for unskilled workers that cannot be otherwise filled.
But any careful review of the economic, political, population, and social
conditions in all of the countries that are the sources of illegal immigrants
as well as the permissive state of existing public policy in the United
States will show that these factors have contributed as much or more to the
flow of illegal immigrants as any such demand conditions.
It is important to realize that Piore and the others who have adopted
his assertions of a minimal job displacement effect in the secondary labor
market do not provide any direct empirical evidence to support their
hypothesis. To the contrary, it is impossible for those who support this
view to name a specific occupation in the U.S. economy in which Census data
cannot be used to show that the vast preponderance of workers doing that
type of work are citizen workers. Indeed, Malcolm Lovell, the Under Secretary
of Labor in testimony that "in 1981, close to 30 percent of all workers
employed in this country, some 29 million people, were hoTding down the
same kind of low-skilled industrial, service, and farm jobs in which illegals
typically find employment.1I27 He added:
The available data also does not support the claim that
Americans will not take low wage jobs. In 1981, an estimated
10.5 million were employed in jobs at or below the minimum
wage and 10 million more were earning within about 35 cents
of that level.28
Hence, it seems absurd to contend that illegal immigrants do work that
citizens will not do when there are currently millions of workers who are
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currently employed in these same occupations. Lovell also pointed out that
the unemployment rates for the segments of the labor force that compete most
directly with illegal immigrants are consistently higher than the national
average--a fact that at least challenges the notion of the nonavailability
of citizen worker.
Furthermore, when there is a shift in the supply of labor, there are
also simultaneous wage effects. These wage effects are typically over-
looked by those who simplistically assert only the employment argument--
that illegal immigrants largely fill jobs that citizens will not take. The
presence of a significant number of illegal immigrants in selected labor
markets will reduce the absolute wage rates below what the market would
have otherwise set. It will also open up relative wage gaps between oc-
cupations and industries that vary with the degree of participation by
illegal immigrants. It is in the context--the artificial suppression of
wages due to the presence of illegal immigrants--that the argument by some
employers that citizen workers are unavailable needs to be appraised. But
this is a self-fulfilling prophecy. It is an argument based upon induced
economic influences rather than the dubious sociological contention that
U.S. workers will not do certain types of work. The working of a normal
labor market--one without the additional shadow labor force of illegal
immigrants--should provide an ample supply of labor if the employers are
willing to pay a competitive wage rate. A survey of employer attitudes in
San Diego toward the employment of illegal immigrants found that
they could afford to pay the competitive wages needed to attract citizen
workers and stay in business but that they preferred not to because they
coul d obtain i 11ega 1 immigrants at lower wages. The study concluded,
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that IIthere is a defi ni te strategy for pull i ng-i n ill ega 1 1abor from across
the border and that thi s strategy is an excellent way toavoi d more expens i ve
American labor.1I29 Consequently, the study found that significant displace-
ment did occur, as a result of the wage depression effect caused by the
bountiful presence of illegal immigrant workers.
As for the characteristics of those workers who compete most directly
with illegal immigrants, all studies and reports are unanimous in their
conclusions that it is the young and the less skilled citizens that are
the most adversely affected by the presence of illegal immigrants. These
citizen groups are disproportionately composed of women and minorities along
with youths in general. In the theory of welfare economics, those persons
who are hurt by a particular policy (i.e., the toleration of illegal immi-
grants in the labor market) could be compensated financially for their
losses by taxing those who benefit (i.e., those who can buy items or services
cheaper or who can hire workers at lower wages) so that society is no worse
off by the action. But if these transfer payments are not actually made--
and no policy proposal has even remotely suggested that this should be or
could be done--this benign principle does not apply.
In the United States, there is a substantial pool of workers who have
employment and earnings difficulties in the labor market. One comprehensive
study placed this number at 40 percent of the people who participated in the
labor force in 1980.30 Not all of these people, of course, are affected by
the presence of illegal immigrants. There is a pronounced geographical
concentration of illegal immigrants so it is essentially only those workers
who are in the secondary labor markets of selected localities (essentially
the same areas that are also the largest recipients of legal immigrants as
t ' t ' 31well) who are confronted with the direct compe 1 lon. But these geo-
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graphic labor markets--such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, Houston, New York
City, Chicago, and San Antonio, to name some of the most prominent--are
among the largest and most influential labor markets in the United States.
Hence, the number of needy citizen workers who are affected by the competition
is likely to be substantial.
One of the major ways to increase the number of job opportunities and
the rewards for seeking earned income for the low income workers and to
enhance labor force participation by potential workers in these labor
geographic labor markets is to reduce the uncontrolled supply of new entrants
into the existing low wage sector of the economy. Many of the jobs performed
by low wage workers are essential to the operation of our economy. Farm
workers, dishwashers, laborers, garbage collectors, building cleaners,
restaurant employees, gardeners, maintenance workers, to name a few occupations,
do perform useful and often indispensable work. The tragedy is that their
renumeration is often so poor. One reason why this is the case is the fact
that there is already a large pool of persons available. Most of these
tasks are not going to go away even if wages do increase. One way to make
these jobs more attractive to citizen workers is to reduce the unfair ad-
dition of millions of illegal aliens into this sector of the economy.
is not ordained that workers who do useful things must be paid poorly.
It
The
normal operation of the labor market should see wages increase in response
to the demand for their essential services. This will not happen, however,
if the supply of such workers is increasing. If the illegal aliens were
flooding into the legal, medical, educational, and business executive oc-
cupations of this country, the problem would have received the highest
national attention and it would have been solved. But because it is the
blue collar, agricultural, and service workers who bear most of the burden
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of the competition, the issue remains largely unaddressed. There is a
definate class bias to the permissiveness associated with American immigration
po1; cy .
Illegal immigrants are not the only cause of unemployment and persistent
low income patterns among certain sub-groups of the American labor force but
they certainly are a factor. The formulation of any serious full employment
strategy for the United States in the 1980s, therefore, will have to include
measures to curtail illegal immigration.
The Primary Labor Market
As for the primary labor market, (e.g., jobs in construction and manu-
facturi ng), there is no debate that the ill ega1 a1i ens employed in these
positions cause a displacement effect. Even though citizen workers are
readily available, illegal aliens are sometimes regarded as "preferred
workers". They are less likely to join unions, or to complain about denial
of equal employment opportunity, safety violations, or sex harassment or
to make other entitlement demands upon employers. One study in 1982, which
disclosed that illegal immigrants were widely employed in the high-paying
construction industry of Houston, Texas, found that foremen and supervisors
preferred to hire illegal immigrants over citizen workers because they could
easily"extract bribes" in the form of wage kickbacks from them.32
Because there is little debate about the labor displacement effects
of citizen workers by illegal immigrants when they are employed in the
primary labor market, it is this sector that the federal government is most
vigilant in its limited enforcement activities. Helping the most privileged
of our society has always been a popular role for government agencies.
Full Employment: The Special Case
It is only in the case of a fully employed economy that it is conceivable
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that the presence of illegal immigrant workers could provide some aggregate
economic benefits to society in the form of higher production due to the
additional supply of labor. Under such special circumstances, it might
even mean that the aggregate costs to society would be lower because of the
increased competition between citizen and alien workers for jobs could reduce
wage pressures. But all of these conceivable benefits would be very limited
because most illegal immigrants--especia11y those from Mexico--are unskilled
and poorly educated. There are technological limits on the amount of pro-
duction that society can obtain as the result of simply increasing the supply
of workers with limited human capital endowments. Given mimimumwage laws,
there are also limits on how low nominal wages can be legally reduced even
if the supply of labor is artifica11y increased. Moreover, even under con-
ditions of full employment there would be severe costs imposed on those
particular sub-groups--youth, women, and minorities--who would bare the
direct competition with illegal immigrants in the form of lower wages and
t o ° t o 33discouraged labor force par lClpa lone These specific costs would have
to be balanced against any possible societal benefits.
Any talk about the theoretical benefits that might accrue to the nation
from illegal immigrants in the context of full employment is a question of
only academic interest. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s unemployment
rates were consistently and persistently high. Moreover, there is a growing
consensus among economists that it may not even be possible to reduce this
rate below 6 to 6.5 percent without triggering unacceptable inflation rates.34
In this context there can be no justification for a benign attitude toward
any factor that contributes to unemployment of citizen workers.
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Non-Economic Effects of Illegal Immigration
In addition to the direct employment and wage effects of a large and
growing shadow labor force of illegal immigrants in the economy, there are
non-economic factors that may even be of greater long term concern to the
welfare of the nation. These involve both the human rights violations that
derive as a natural by-product of such an issue and the long run political
consequences to the nation of institutionalizing the existence of a sub-class
within the population.
For those persons who lIenter without inspectionll, the entire entry
process is dangerous to the safety of the people involved. It often in-
volves the use of professional smugglers (called IIcoyotesll) who extract
exorbitant fees for the transportation and the false documents that they
provide.35 Often their charges may consume the life savings of the in-
dividuals involved. If the individuals do not have sufficient funds, they
may be loaned the additional amounts by IIloan sharks II who charge outrageous
interest rates and enforce repayment by the use of brute force. Some
IIcoyotesll rob and otherwise abuse the illegal immigrants.36 In many cases,
the smugglers use means and tactics of transportation that are life threatening.37
Once in the United States, illegal immigrants must live under constant
fear of detection by authorities or of being taken advantage of by oppor-
tunists. As one illegal Mexican immigrant explained: IIBeing here is like
a prison, a golden prison; you have everything but you have nothing. 1138
Nominally, illegal immigrants are entitled to the protections of the nation1s
laws but, in fact, their illegal status often means that they are fearful
to exert their rights to protection.
In sum, there is nothing romantic about the illegal immigration process.
They are often placed at the mercy of the most undesirable elements of both
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nations. In the United States, the indifference of society and of policy-
makers toward the plight of illegal immigrants represents one of the most
seamy aspects of contemporary American life. One explanation has been
offered by a congressional official who observed, "nobody gives a damn"
about illegal immigrants since they are "nobodies constituents.1I39
Increasingly, the treatment of illegal immigrants from Mexico in the
United States has become a subject of complaint by the Mexican government.
For example Luis Echeverria, during his term as President of Mexico, declared:
We insist upon the defense of the human and labor
rights of those who work in foreign countries....
Even though they carryon an illegal activity in
the territory of another state, they should never-
theless be prote~8ed by law as 'migratory workers
without papers..4
His successor, President Lopez Portillo was equally vehement in his demands
for their protection. But, any demand that the United States protect the
rights of people who clandestinely enter the country in violation of its
laws and who, accordingly, are forced into a sub rosa life style of constant
--
fear of detection can hardly be taken seriously. There is very little that
can be done in any realistic way to protect the rights of these helpless
people. In fact, the government of Mexico cannot even protect the illegal
immigrants from mistreatment by their fellow Mexican citizens who often
serve as "coyotes, II or who also sell counterfeit documents at exorbi tant
prices, or who are the Mexican border officials who sometimes arrange
their exodus or prey upon them when they return and demand a "mordida"
(i.e., a bribe or extortion payment). Once in the United States, illegal
immigrants are vulnerable to other opportunistic elements (who are often
Chicanos) as well as some employers who wish to exploit their total de-
pendence for economic gain. Sometimes, they fall victim to violent elements
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both in the border towns and inland areas who subject them to physical abuse.4l
Of course, officials in the United States should try to stop all of these
inhuman and often illegal acts but, in reality, the very nature of their
illegal status makes it virtually impossibls to prevent these actions from
occurring. At best, all the United States government can do is to react to
the exploitation and the abuses after they have occurred. It can and should
seek punishment where civil and criminal violations can be documented. But
even in these circumstances, it is difficult to take action if the illegal
immigrants themselves do not report offences; or are unwilling or unavailable
to press charges and to testify at hearings; or if local district attorneys
will not prosecute and local juries refuse to convict offenders. The fact
is that illegal immigration is a process. that brings to the surface the worst
human elements in both Mexican and United States societies. There is only
one real human rights policy that can be advocated:
before it takes place.
stop illegal entry
Even more insiduous is the fact that as the number of illegal immigrants
continues to mount, the United States is rapidly acquiring a sub-class of
persons whose rights are circumscribed from those of the larger citizenry.
Although technically able to avail themselves of many legal rights and
protections, few illegal aliens do so. To make matters worse, they and
their family members are being legislatively excluded from much of the basic
social legislation in this nation. These exclusions vary from the Federal
level where illegal aliens are denied eligibility for Supplemental Security
Income, Medicaid, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children, to individual
1 . t 42state exclusions from unemployment compensation programs and genera aSS1S ance.
In Texas, an attempt was even made to forbid children of illegal immigrant
families from attending public schools without being charged tuition. In
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a close 5-4 vote, the U.S. Supreme Court in June 1982 struck down the Texas
statute. The majority opinion of the Court held that education is of unique
importance to both individuals and society and that it would be unfair to
force innocent children to bear the burden of their parents' illegal status.43
Collectively, these actions represent embarrassing efforts by our society
to avoid the legitimate costs of our own policy inadequacies.
In addition, if illegal immigrants pay social security taxes, they are
likely to be contributing to ficticious accounts for which they will never
receive any benefits even though they may some day desperately need the
social protections that this system is designed to provide.
illegal immigrants are denied the political right to vote.
At all 1eve 1s ,
Certainly the growth of a sub-class of rightless illegal aliens can
not be in the nation's long term interest.
to function with a sub-class in its midst.
Once before the nation tried
Then it was slavery and the
nation is still trying to overcome the legacy of that episode.
experience that, if it can be helped, should not be repeated.
It is an
Policy Reform to Address the Question of Illegal Immigration
When it released its final report in 1981, the Select Commission on
Immigration and Refugee Policy observed that illegal immigration had
reached such a magnitude that their was a widely held perception in the
nation that "immigration policy was out of control.,,44 In response to
these concerns as well as other needed reforms in the nation IS immigration
status, a comprehensive immigration bill was introduced to address some--
but not all--of the more blatant policy deficiencies. The bill was known
as the Immigration Reform and Control Act Cor popularly as the Simpson-
~1azzo 1 i Bi 11 ) . It passed the Senate in August 1982 but died on the floor
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of the House of Representatives in December 1982 in the waning hours of
the 97th Congress. The bill was re-introduced with the same name in
February 1983 in the 98th Congress.
Contained in the myriad of studies, reports, and legislative proposals
that have addressed the issue of illegal immigration, a variety of pOlicy
changes have been suggested. Not surprisingly, there is more agreement
about the need than there is for the precise means of reform. The fo 11 ow-
i ng topi cs, however, have been the mos t promi nent topi cs of concern.
Employer Sanctions
Any strategy to combat illegal immigration must start with the need
to curtail their demand. Thus, repeal of the IITexas provisoll and the
adoption of a law to make the employment of illegal immigrants an. illegal
act have been natural starting poi nts of a 11 reform movements. An em-
ployer saction law would set the moral tone. It would define precisely
who is in compliance with the laws of the land and who is not. Presently,
all employers who hire illegal inllligrants are fully within their rights to
do so. An employer sanctions law will clearly state the fact illegal
inmigrants are not wanted as workers in the United States.
Tentative steps toward the enactment of a national employer sanctions
bill have already begun. In 1974, the Farm Labor Contractor Registration
Act of 1963 was amended to require that employers of migrant farm workers in
the United States as of 1976 are prohibited from IIrecruiting, employing, or
.
.
. t 45utilizing, with knowledgell any illegal lmnngran s. The Act itself places
numerous other requirements upon labor contractors that are designed to
.protect migrant farm workers from unscrupulous activities by the con-
tractors for whom they are technically employed (as opposed to theagricu1-
tura 1 growers who contract with the contractor).
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Twice during the early 1970s, the U.S. House of Representatives passed
legislation that would have enacted an employer ban on hiring illegal immi-
grants only to see both bills die in committees of the Senate. In the
meantime, several states who were concerned about the growing number of
illegal immigrants in their midst adopted employer sanctions laws. It
was widely believed at the time, however, that these laws were unconstitu-
tional since immigration matters were believed to be the sole perrogative
of the federal government. To the surprise of most legal scholars, however,
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a California employer
. 46 .
sanctions law in 1976. Since then, at least eleven states passed similar
laws but, as of 1980, only one employer in any of these states had been
convicted and given a pittance fine for such an offense. 47 The problem
appears to be that states do not have sufficient experience with the
enforcement of immigration laws and they have been reluctant to set up
the legal apparatus that would be needed to enforce such a law. Also, of
course, the state laws vary immensely in their provisions and penalties.
The actions by these states, therefore, should be interpreted as an act of
desperation that is designed to be more of a prod to the federal government
to assume this responsibility as part of its broader immigration enforcement
responsibilities than as a genuine desire for the states themselves to enter
into this area of law enforcement.
In 1981, the Select Commission voted 14-2 in favor of a recommendation
that Congress adopt a law that makes /lit illegal for an employer to hire un-
documented workers. ..48 The Simpson-Mazzol i bi 11, in turn, sought to
accomplish exactly that task. 'The bill envisioned Q prohibition
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on the employment of illegal immigrants with civil penalties that would
range from warnings to fines for first and second time offenders and criminal
penalties that include higher fines and even jail terms for repeat offenders.
Small employers (of less than 3 employees) would not have been covered.
The most vocal opposition to the concept b.asconsi.ste1y come from
Hispanic organizations and other groups generally sympathetic with. the
plight of illegal immigrants. In general, their opposition stems from
fear that employers will use such sanctions as an excuse to di.scrimi.nate
against persons who ha.ve accents or Spanish surnames or stereotypical
attributes. The United States Civil Rights Commission, whose views
are also shared by a number of other civil liberties organizations, had also
taken an earlier stand--by a vote of 3-2--against the concept of employer
sanctions. It stated in 1980 that:
An employer sanctions law would be an unjustifiable
imposition of law enforcement duties upon private per-
sons and corporations with undesirable consequences not
only for the employer but for the due process of job
applicants. Moreover, increased employment discrimina-
tion against United States citizens and legal residents
who are racially and culturally identifiabile with
major immigrant groups could b~9the unintended result
of an employer sanctions law.
As a consequence, the Commission, on another split vote of 3 to 2, explicitly
recommended in 1980 that "Congress should not enact an employer sanctions
501a\'l. II
,
A National Idenfitication System
Obviously, if an employer sanctions law is enacted, it is necessary to
specify exactly what an employer must do to be in compliance. A mere query
is hardly adequate. With fradu1ent documents readily available both inside
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and outside the country, existing forms of identification (i.e., birth cer-
tificates, social security cards, driver's licenses, etc.) are absolutely
. ff . . t 51lnsu lClen. Without the establishment of some sort of universal iden-
tification system, the result of a strong employer sanctions law could be
that employers might act in a discriminatory manner toward citizens from
ethnic groups that are similar to those .that comprise the majority of illegal
immigrants. This concern is real. Hence, the required identification must
be something that is required of all work-seekers.
One suggestion has been that a new form of social security cards be
used. 52 Since January 1,1973, citizenship or resident alien status has
been specifically required as a condition to receive a social security card. 53
But the existing card is easily counterfeited. Hence, any new card must be .
bothnon-counterfeitable and unalterable. Through the use of cards with
special codes already developed by cryptographers and computer experts it
.would be easy to verify the citizenship status of any would-be employee.
Th.e card could be similar to those issued since 1977 by the Itnnligration and
Naturalization Service to resident aliens (I.e., the ADIT card or Alien
Documentation, Identification, and Telecommunications system) which includes
a photograph, signature, fingerprint, and several rows of coded numbers.
The social securHy numbers co.uld be used to s.upply these tdenttfication num-
bers for general usage. The Soci a 1 Security card--or more speci.fica lly the
social security number--is already required as a condition of employment in
the private sector for virtually everyone. The same is true for most public
employees. Thus, the issue of principle with respect to the fact that U.S.
citizens must have identification numbers bas already been settled.
it or not, the Social Security number has already become a national
Like
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identifier. The Social Security number is used as a student identifica-
tion number on many campuses; it is used as the driver's license
number in eight states; it is used by the Internal Revenue Service
to identify taxpayers; and it is the serial number of all people in the
military. The point is: It is absurd to worry about whether something will
happen if it has already happened. The only questions that remain are,
should Social Security cards be made noncounterfeitable and should checks
be made of the"se. cards to ensure that those who are using them to seek em-
ployment are legally entitled to have them?
David North and Marion Houstoun, who have given close study to the iden-
tification issue as it relates to the problem of illegal immigration, have
recommended a work permit system similar to that used in many other industrial~
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ized nations as being better "than any other proposed system." The details
of a workable proposal were spelled out in a later study by North.55 The
system would involve the establishment of a nationwide data base. Workers
entering the labor force or changing jobs would be required to obtain a work
authorization number that would be on file at the federal data bank. The
number would be issued only after the individual offered some proof that he
or she was a citizen or resident alien. Employers would only have to call-in
to a toll free data bank after they had hired someone to check the citizenship
eligibility of the newly hired person. In return, they would receive a trans-
actions number from the data bank that would suffice to be in compliance with
the employer sanction provisions. The advantage of this system would be that
it would not involve any type of card or require employers to make any type
of judgment themselves about the eligibility of a jOb applicant. A would-be
worker would have to make application for a work permit at the nearest office
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of the public employment service. Several options would be available to the
applicant to prove his or her eligibility t~rough reliance on some sort of
historic data {e.g., among these would be proof of payment of income taxes for
a number of past years; proof of paid social secuirty taxes for a set number
of past years; service in the military; government employment; naturalized
citizenship status; etc.} An applicant would have to provide at least t~o
different proofs. Only information provided by the applicant would be on file.
A check of the provided information could be made with existing data already
on file in various government data banks. If the computers confirmed the
individuals legal presence in the nation, the work permit would be issued.
This system was specifi cally endorsed by Ray Marsha11, the Secretary of Labor
during the Carter Administration and a member of the Select Commission on
Immigration and Refugee Policy.56
There are other types of identification.57 But for the present purpose,
the point is that a new identification must be included in any employer sanction
program if it has any hope for success. Yet, the members of the Select
,
Commission--who overwhelmingly endorsed an employees sanction law--voted
only 8 to 7 (with one absent) in favor of coupling the proposed sanctions
measure with some form of secure employee identification system. Moreover,
the meager majority "was' unable to reach a consensus as to the specific
type of identification that should be required for verification .1158 The
use of a counterfeit proof Social Security card had the strongest support
of the ideas that were considered.
When the Reagan Administration offered its proposals on this issue, it
recommended employer sanctions but it too was reluctant to face squarely
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the identification issue. Attorney General William F. Smith stated lithe
Administration is opposed to the creation of a national identity card" but,
he added, lithe Administration does recognize the need for ameans of compli-
ance with the law that would provide an employer with a good faith defense
if he examines documentary proof of eligibility to work."59 Accordingly,
the Administration recommended that acceptable proof of eligibility to work
would be permanent resident alien card issued by INS or a temporary worker
visa for non-citizens and for citizens any two of the following documents:
a birth certificate, drivers license, social security card, or a registration
certification issued by the Selective Service System. In addition, for
every newly hi.red person the employer and the new employee would sign a form
certifying that the newly hired employee is eligible to work in the United
States and that the employer has inspected the specified documents offered
by the new emp1oyee. The employer would be required to retain the form for
possible inspection by the INS if requested.
Despite the views of the Attorney General that this approach was suffi-
cient, the drafters of the Simpson-Mazzoli bill were not satisfied. They
clearly believed as did many others, that all of the documents that were
mentioned were easily available in counterfeit form. Accordingly, if this
,
was to be the identifier system, it was felt that the intentions of the
employer sanctions law would be effectively negated. Hence, the bill re-
jected the Reagan proposals and, instead, it would have mandated that the
President design and implement a fraud-resistant system for determining the
eligibility 'of applicants for employment. The bill specified that the Presi-
dent would have a three year period in which to establish such a system.
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The system could only be used for the purposes of verifying that employees
had the right to work in the United States. Wisely, from a political stand-
point, the bill did not specify or endorse any specific identification system.
Such specificity, it was felt, would divert attention away from the principle
itself--the need for a fraud resistant identification system--to a particular
means.
In the Congressional debate--especially'in the House of Representatives--
this issue proved to be especially worrisome to many congressmen. The U.S.
Civil Rights Commission also had specifically rejected the idea that any
type of national idenfitication system be established. It contended that
"such a national identity card would provide a tool that could be used to
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violate the right to privacy of the individual.". Responding to a similar
concern made by others, the Rev. Theodore Hesburgh, who not only had been
chairnlan of the Select Commission but was himself a former chairman of the
U.S. Civil Rights Ccmmission, dismissed these fears. He wrote in 1982 that:
Identification systems to be used upon application
for a job and for work purposes ar: no different ~rom
other forms of identification r~qu~red by our ~oclety
today and readily accepted by mllllons of Amerlcans:
credit cards which must be checked by merchants;
identification cards other than driver's licenses
used for cashing checks; social security number~ to
open bank accounts, register for school or obtaln
employment.
...Raising the specter of "Big Br~the~dom", calling
a worker identification system totalltarlan or label- .
ling it lithe computer taboo" does. not furth:r the.de-6l
bate on U.S. immigration policy; lt only pOlsons It.
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Increased Funding for INS
The necessity of significantly enlarging the enforcement activities of
the INS is too obvious to be belabored. It is the one issue about which
there has been no opposition from any quarter. The Reagan Administration,
after initially calling for a reduction in "funds for enforcement," later,
reversed itself and made the INS and exception to its general non-military
budget reduction efforts in 1982. It subsequently went so far as to actually
seek an increase in the appropriations for INS activities. This action was
.done despite the fact that the Simpson Mazzoli bill--which contained a "sense
of Congress II provision that funding for this purpose should be significantly
increased--did not pass.that year.
Less Reliance on the Voluntary Departure System
Unfortunately, there was virtually no attention given to the voluntary
departure system as a factor that contributes to illegal immigration in the
work of the Select Commission or the debates on the Simpson-Mazzoli bill.
But it is doubtful that any policy to stop illegal immigration can ever be
taken seriously so long as there is virtually no chance of any penalty being
imposed on offenders. Until all illegal "immigrants can be identified, records
kept, and repeat offenders subjected to formal deportation (which would
permanently preclude those individuals from ever becoming legal immigrants),
there is no reason for an illegal alien even to ponder the risks. The alien
has nothing to lose. More reliance on legal procedures, however, will be
costly and time-consuming and \'lill also necessitate an increase in the INS
budget. But these costs, as well as expenses related to the acquisition of
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more detection hardware, must be weighted against the costs of allowing this
mushrooming problem to continue. It will be far less costly to assume a
strong posture of prevention than it will be to respond to the. social problems
inherent in this issue after they accumulate.
I
Enhanced Trade and Development Assistance
International policies must be part of the policy mix to reduce the flow
of illegal immigrants. They are needed to address the "push" factors. They
should be directed primarily at efforts to assist in the economic development
of Mexico and the Caribbean area. These meaSUres should include extensive
offers of technical and financial assistance to our neighbors. These efforts
may have to be n~de through esta6lished multinational agencies--such as the
World Bank, the International Nonetary Fund,'or the United Nations--instead
of unilaterally. Mexico, in particular, is a proud nation; its leaders have
traditionally abhored the concept of direct foreign aid from the United States.
It must be realized that to some degree the problem of illegal aliens
from Nexico is a by-product of past actions by the United States. For too
many years, Mexico was seen as a pool of cheap labor that could be tapped
at will throughout the Southwest. Hence, U.S. policymakers cannot be
oblivious to the legacy of past actions in the creation of present problems.
For this past role the United States is obligated to assist the Mexican
government in reducing the economic forces that continue to "push" many
of its citizens into the illegal immigration stream. To be sure, the
population explosion, rural-to-urban migration, and the structural
labor-market changes resulting grom the introduction of capital inten-
sive technologies in Mexico would have caused the illegal alien flow
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to occur regardless of any past actions by the United States. But
that contention is really moot. The fact is that the United States did
contribute to some of the forces. that have institutionalized illegal migration.
The United States cannot place the full responsibility for stopping the flow
upon Mexico.
The United States should carefully reassess its trade and tariff policies
pertaining to Mexico and the entire Caribbean Basin. Efforts to lessen the
restrictive barriers on agricultural and manufacturing imports from the countries
of this area are essential. Such actions would enhance the opportunities for
export. industries in these nations to expand and reduce some of the pressures
causing illegal entry. It would also acknowledge the fact that Mexico in .'
particular and many other nations in this region in general are already major
importers of U.S.-made goods.
The, Reagan Administration in 1982 did seek to enact a Caribbean Basin
program that would seek to accomplish most of these outlined objectives. This
initiative was not specifically linked to the immigration reform legislation
although it certainly has implicit implications that are to that effect.
explicit rationale for the program, instead, was couched in terms of good
The
foreign policy relations. The proposal would have restricted aid to non-
comnunist nations in the region. Amongits provisions was a proposal for a
twelve year moratorium on duties on certain imports into the United States.
The 28 eligible countries would not have. to reciprocate with respect to U.S.
exports to their countries. It also contained incentives for U.S. firms to
i.nvest in these nations as well as financial aid to help stimulate economic
development. Unfortunately, this bill also died in the waning hours of the
97th Congress when the Senate failed to act even though the House of Rep-
resentatives had overwhelmingly passed it.
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An Increase in the Number of Legal Immigrants Permitted from Mexico
The Simpson-Hazzoli bill sought to make a special excepti.on for Mexico
and Canada with respect to the number of legal immigrants that could be
admitted from these neighboring nations each year. Currently, there is a
ceiling of 20,000 visas a year that can be issued to would-be immigrants
from any single country. The bill proposed that this ceiling be main-
tained except for these two neighboring nations. Each. would bave had its
ceiling increased to 40,000 and a reciprocity agreement was included that
would have allowed one nation to use any of the unused visas of the other.
Since Canada has not in recent years used all of the 20,000 visas available
to it, the immediate intention is clear: Mexico could gain a significant
number of additional visas. The increase in visas would reduce the mas~ive
backlog in Mexican visa requests totalling 271,854 visas as of January 1,
1982, and, accordingly, it would help reduce some of the pressures to
become illegal immigrants or to remain one if the individual had already
illegally immigrated while waiting for his or her visa request to be
acted upon.
As a step toward the reduction of the number of illegal immigrants in the
U.S. labor market, this change should be made. It was a mistake in 1976 to
have put legal immigration from Mexico on the same footing.as that of other
nations. As equitable as it might have seemed at the time, it does not recognize
the reality of Mexican immigration pressures. Similar proposals were -made by
the Carter Administration and by the Select Commission.
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Enforcement of Labor Standards
Although the available research shows that the overwhelming number of
illegal immigrants are not "exploited" in the legal sense that they are paid
below federal minimumwage lev~ls or work under conditions that are inferior
to those of comparable citizen workers, some are. Hence, all of the various
studies, and legislative proposals, that have addressed the problem of illegal
immigration have included homilies about the need to enforce existing fair
labor standards. Presumably, if these laws were adequately enforced, the need
for illegal immigrants would recede and the illegal immigrants stop coming.
Michael Piore has even gone so far as to make this policy the centerpiece of
h . 1. - d t . 6215 po lCY recommen a lons.
Certainly no one can argue against the need for more effective enforcement
of prevailing labor standards for all workers--citizens or not. But this, it
5eems~ is a weak reed upon which to place the weight of an attack upon illegal
immigration. To begin with, it is doubtful that most illegal immigrants are
legally exploited in the work place. Some are and so are some citizens.
Greater enforcement efforts might lead to less abuse of the nation1s labor laws
but it is doubtful that it can do very much to stop the employment of illegal
,
immigrants. After all, these laws can only be used to assure that minimum
standards prevail. If they do, than that is a11 that can be enforced.. J'1ore-
over, while it is true that some labor standard enforcement activities are
initiated by government agencies, most of the violations that are reported
are the result of employee-initiated compla!nts. This is the way it has al-
ways been and, probably, always will be. But -illegal immigrants are less
likely to know how to make such complaints and, more importantly, if they
do know they are certainly--given their precarious status in the country--
quite unlikely to file complaints.
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"Forgiveness" to Those Already Here
No matter what estimate is made of the stock of illegal immigrants re-
siding in the United States, it is acknowledged to be a large number of
persons. If immigration reform should eventually succeed in outlawing the
employment of illegal immigrants, the immediate question is what is to
become with all of those who are already in the country. The tolerant policy
to date has unofficially condoned the influx of illegal immigrants. It is
totally unrealistic to believe that any roundup of existing illegal immi-
grants~~who have established themselves in jobs and often have families
with them--could be accomplished without immense personal hardship, ex-
tensive litigation, and expensive financial costs. Hence, it is essential
that some form of forgiveness, or amnesty, be given to those who have
resided in the country prior to a specified date. The date, of course, has
to be set in the past in order to preclude any mass flood of new immigrants,
who might seek to beat a future amnesty deadline.
All of the proposals for immigration reforms have contained some form of
forgiveness that would cover what is believed to be the vast majority of the
illegal immigration population. In general, the proposals would offer the
opportunity for citizenship if they were to register within a set grace
period; if they could prove that they have lived in the United States on a
continuous basis prior to and since some specified date; and if they are
not specifically a member of one of the th.irty-three categories of people who
are excluded from bei ng admitted as immi.grants from any country. There is not
much difficulty in handling the procedures that would apply to those who bave
been in the country for many years. Congressional actions on three
past occasions have allowed persons to register to become eligible
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for citizenship if they have lived in the country continuously since
a set date (as of 1982) the date in June 30) 1948). These registry
revisions represent precedents that could be used again for this
portion of the illegal immigrant population. For those who have been in
the country for say) 3 to 5 years) the proposals generally have provided
for a temporary holding status after which the people involved would
probably be allowed to adjust their status to become a res-ident alien.
The exact permanent status of this class) however, is seldom specified.
For those that have entered recently, say within a year or two prior to
the date when the proposed laws become effective, there, would be no
amnesty. Presumably they and other illegal immigrants who did not avail
themselves of the opportunity to register during the grace period or who
were found to be ineligible for citizenship would be subject ot return to
their native land if they were apprehended. For this residual group, in
..
other words, there would be no change from the status
~
nor would there
be any accommodation for illegal immigrants who enter the country in the
future and who are apprehended.
The forgiveness issue has always been one of the most controversial
features of all of the reform packages. Many people feel that to extend a
form of amnesty to people who violated the laws of the nation serves to
reward wrong-doers. Would-be. immigrants are supposed to wait to be admitted.
~1any applicants for inrnigration are found ineligible--especially those who
do not have family relatives who are already citizens or permanent resident
aliens. Others are found to be members of an excludable class. Nost of
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these individuals must resign themselves to staying where they are. But,
the argument goes, those who are either not eligible or who have shown no
respect for the laws of the nation by illegally immigrating are given by
amnesty what they seek. On the other hand, those who have adhered to the
law and either wait their turn or accept the fact that they cannot immigrate
are essentially punished. Amnesty to many people seems entirely undeserved.
Moreover, they feel that amnesty will set a bad precedert. They fear that
having once given amnesty and, given the immense "push" factors that are
involved in the illegal immigration process, it will be necessary to do it
again and again in the future.
Another factor that has added to the fears of those who are opposed to
amnesty pertains to the potential cost. Given the disproportionate number of
persons who are unskilled and poorly educated, it is feared that many among
the i11~ga1 immigration population will suddenly become eligible for the
broad array of social services that are available to similarly situated citi-
zens. Amongthese are food stamps, medicaid, aid for families with dependent
children, unemployment compensation, and housing subsidies, to name some of
the more prominent entitlement programs. There is already some evidence,
,
although it is inconsistent, that there is "substantial use or attempted
use" of the existing federal and state income transfer systems by illegal
immigrants despite the fact that they are specifically excluded from
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eligibility from these programs. The National Association of
Counties (NACO) in 1982 stated that its support for amnesty in the
Simpson-Mazzo1i Bill was contingent upon two conditions: "that strong
enforcement measures, including employer sanctions, be implemented to control
future illegal immigration; and that the federal government reimburse state and
10ga1 government for additional costs resulting from a legalization program. II64
48
NACO estimated that the total cost of governmental cash and medical assistance
to illegal immigrants who would be granted amnesty under the Simpson-Mazzo1i
bill (i.e., with an eligibility cut off of being in the country prior to January
1,1980) would be $1.1 billion dollars. NACOestimated that over half of this
,
sum--$546.8 million would be borne by state and local governments.65 Given
the geographical concentration of illegal immigrants, it is likely that this
burden would be carried by only a few states and local governments. For them,
of course, this burden--if it materia1ized--cou1d be substantial. Estimates
of anticipated local costs, however, could be higher than those made by NACO.
For not only do some states and localities have many more illegal immigrants
than do others but some have more liberal coverage provisions and more types of
social programs than do others. For instance in California, the costs of an
amnesty-program to the state were estimated to be $1.3 bi11ion.:66 In New York
City, no specific dollar cost was computed but officials believed that the
cities total welfare budget could rise from "5 to 10 percent" and that "with
legalization, NewYork City can expect a significant rise in utilization of
municipal hospitals and out-patient clinics, which are 100 percent city-funded,
as well as a substantial increase in the st'Bte and local shares of total
Medicaid, public assistance, and social service expenditures.1I6?
In response to these concerns, it has been argued that these numbers may
be excessive since, supposedly, a person would not be eligible to adjust his
or he~ status if there is any likelihood that they will become a public charge
(i.e., they would belong to an excludable class). Also, Senator Allan Simpson
argued that IIthese people are not refugees; these people came to the United
States for one reason: to work."68 Hence,. he felt that these cost concerns
about a dependency population wi.ll prove to be unfounded.
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It was the case, however, that the Simpson-Mazzoli bill did not include
any federal reimbursement provisions for any incurred costs that would fall
upon the state and local governments. Presumably, the federal government
would be responsible for its share of any costs that did materialize from
increased use of jointly funded income transfer programs.
Concluding Observations
Illegal immigration into the United States is not a problem that has a
definite solution. In many ways it is a dilemma of a free society. It is
unlikely that the United States will ever be able to stop completely the
flow of persons who illegally seek to enter. Yet the problem is not one that
can be ignored simply because of the difficulties that may be involved in
designing appropriate policy responses. The policy objective, therefore, is
not to seek to stop illegal immigration entirely--that would be impossible.
Rather, the goal is to bring the flow under control by significantly re-
ducing both its scale and its incumbent adverse impacts. Laws against
speeding on the nation's highways have not stopped all speeders but they
have probably reduced the incidence of speeding from what it would be in
their absence. Moreover, laws against speeding have enabled law enforce-
ment officials to focus attention upon the most serious offenders. The
same expectations can be made about policy measures to control illegal
immigration. Presently, there are not meaningful deterrents to illegal
immigrants which, at least implicitly, signals to many people of other
countries that the nation is not really serious when it says that it
wishes to have a regulated immigration policy. This incongruity needs
to be rectified.
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If by chance the United States should achieve full employment in the
near future and if, under these special circumstances, labor shortages in
certain low skilled occupations do occur, there is a preferable alternative
to reliance upon illegal ilTll1igration as a means of filling such needs. It
is, of course~ through the front door to the nation's labor force by making
use of the occupational preference categories of the legal immigration sys-
.
tern. Presently, it is only highly skilled and educated immigrants who are
admitted under these provisions in response to perceived labor market
shortages for the demand for their talents. Butt there is no reason why
the legal system could not be adapted to meet real shortages--if they
should exist--for low skilled workers as well.
There is absolutely no justification that can be made for the use of
illegal immigration as a means to supply workers to the labor force. If
there are no real labor shortages, illegal immigrants endanger themselves
. and do positive harm to the employmentand income opportunities for
citizen workers; if there are or should be real labor shortages, the
honorable course is to enlarge the flow of legal immigrants who are un-
skilled and poorly educated to meet any such labor market shortages.
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